The risk rosette for a rollup

Fragmentos de código

curl "https://api.oanor.com/l2beat-api/v1/risks" \
  -H "x-oanor-key: oanor_test_..."

await fetch("https://api.oanor.com/l2beat-api/v1/risks", {
  headers: { "x-oanor-key": "oanor_test_..." }
});

$ch = curl_init("https://api.oanor.com/l2beat-api/v1/risks");
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, ["x-oanor-key: oanor_test_..."]);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
$out = curl_exec($ch);

import requests
requests.get(
    "https://api.oanor.com/l2beat-api/v1/risks",
    headers={"x-oanor-key": "oanor_test_..."}
)

Respuesta de ejemplo

Una respuesta real de este endpoint, capturada en la última comprobación de estado.

{
    "data": {
        "id": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain",
        "type": "layer2",
        "risks": [
            {
                "name": "Sequencer Failure",
                "value": "Self sequence",
                "sentiment": "good",
                "description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation."
            },
            {
                "name": "State Validation",
                "value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
                "sentiment": "good",
                "description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used."
            },
            {
                "name": "Data Availability",
                "value": "Onchain",
                "sentiment": "good",
                "description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
                "name": "Exit Window",
                "value": "None",
                "sentiment": "bad",
                "description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council."
            },
            {
                "name": "Proposer Failure",
                "value": "Self propose",
                "sentiment": "good",
                "description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge."
            }
        ],
        "stage": "Stage 1",
        "source": "L2BEAT",
        "category": "Optimistic Rollup",
        "risk_count": 5,
        "sentiment_summary": {
            "bad": 1,
            "good": 4
        }
    },
    "meta": {
        "timestamp": "2026-06-12T01:42:43.682Z",
        "request_id": "4bfda8dc-0983-4172-83c3-a64cc69b6221"
    },
    "status": "ok",
    "message": "Risks retrieved successfully",
    "success": true
}